I. INTRODUCTION

"When public goods are treated as a commodity, the needs of people are put in conflict with the companies' desire to profit, and we always lose." -Gary Straud, public housing resident, and Anthony Coates, President of AFSCME Local 647 1
Traditional public housing is dwindling. Federal policy has increasingly encouraged privatization, shifting stewardship of public housing out of the hands of government and into the hands of private, for-profit companies. Privatization in this context has both benefits and risks. A particularly compelling area of study is the attempt by lawmakers to conscript private contractors into serving public policy goals. Private landlords are obligated not merely to provide housing, but to conduct themselves in ways that promote the interests of vulnerable people. The case of public housing suggests that legislative mandates and contractual obligations are not enough to assure this outcome, and must be accompanied by a commitment to vigorous monitoring and enforcement.
Over the past two decades, public housing has joined the list of traditionally-public functions-including military combat, the administration of welfare benefits, and incarceration-that are carried out by private companies. The line between "public" and "private" is not easily drawn, 2 but "private" entities are commonly and properly understood to LEELEE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2015 3:24 PM
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TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:759 Can publicization fill the accountability gap caused by privatization? An excellent case study is presented by the federal public housing program. Congress has conditioned privatization on the preservation of certain rights and protections that are traditionally associated with governmental actors. For example, landlords must follow procedures very much like those mandated by Constitutional due process, must subject some contracts to notice-and-comment procedures, and must consult with residents before making certain business decisions about the housing. Such requirements derive from the Constitution and from democratic principles promoting an engaged citizenry, and lawmakers have tasked private landlords with their implementation. Whether this effort will succeed or fail has consequences for the public housing program as well as for other industries where publicization is desirable.
The primary mechanism for publicization in this context is contract. Scholars have begun to inquire into contract's adequacy to coerce private actors into public service, 9 and this article furthers that inquiry. It concludes that in this particular context, the contractual scheme will fail to achieve the goals of publicization because it lacks both adequate rights monitoring and adequate remedies for rights violations. It argues for a new legislative mandate for federal enforcement, and proposes that public housing residents themselves play a greater role in the monitoring scheme.
Part II of this article begins with a brief history of public housing. For over seventy years, public housing has been nearly exclusively owned and operated by governmental entities. Since the mid-1990's, however, federal policy has strongly promoted privatization and today, perhaps as much as fifteen percent of public housing is privatized or designated to be privatized. Over the next few years, privatization will very likely become an option for the entire public housing inventory.
Part II also discusses why privatization is widely viewed as the only politically viable future for public housing, and briefly analyzes its impact on certain areas of policy concern, including economic efficiency, long-term affordability, and racial segregation and place-based deprivation.
The article then turns to an aspect of public housing privatization that has so far received little attention: the likely erosion of certain critical resident rights and benefits. Part II discusses the doctrinal origins of these benefits and their importance to the wellbeing of residents. Part III then examines the Congressional mandate to preserve these rights and the contractual scheme used to carry out that mandate. It suggests that publicization will ultimately fail because the federal monitoring scheme devalues these rights, contractual remedies are inadequate, and resident enforcement mechanisms may have less potency in the privatized context. The article further suggests a number of specific reforms that emphasize the importance of a federal enforcement scheme that incorporates resident perspectives. Public housing shelters over 2.3 million people nationwide. 11 Since the program was created in 1937, public housing policy has been set at the federal level, while local governmental agencies have implemented these mandates. 12 Today, over 3,100 local governmental entities across the country own and operate public housing, acting as "government landlords." 13 These entities are usually controlled by boards of directors appointed by a mayor or by another public official. 14 Public housing's original purposes included improving housing conditions for formerly middle-class workers left homeless by the Depression, as well as stimulating the 10 11. This number is derived from HUD administrative data from 2010, adjusted to 2013. The data is available at: http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/picture/yearlydata.html#data-display-tab.
12. For a discussion of the extent of federal control over public housing policy, see Otto J. economy. 15 The program boomed after the Second World War 16 in order to accommodate returning veterans. 17 It also began to house increasing numbers of poorer people, including racial and ethnic minorities. 18 By the 1960s and 1970s, the public housing population had become predominantly black, 19 with high-rise towers in urban cores deliberately segregating black residents into communities of concentrated poverty. 20 As costs increased, federal subsidies became the primary source of support for the program. In the early days, direct subsidies were unnecessary, since federally guaranteed municipal bonds generally paid for construction costs 21 and rent paid by residents covered operational costs. As public housing opened its doors to the very poor, however, rent payments became insufficient to cover operating costs. Some local agencies began charging higher rents that were unaffordable to many residents, and in response to rent strikes staged by residents in the late 1960's, 22 federal policymakers capped the amount of rent that residents were required to pay and the federal government began to directly subsidize operational costs as well as capital costs. 23 Against this backdrop-an increased reliance on taxpayer dollars, and a resident community that was the object of hostility and fear-public housing development came to a standstill. Emphasis shifted to other housing programs 24 and to finding alternatives to government-owned and operated housing. 25 15. See Today, a variety of programs rely on private landlords to own and operate affordable housing. 26 Two programs now eclipse public housing in terms of the number of low-income people served. The first is the so-called "Section 8" program, a term that encompasses a wide variety of programs, most of which involve privately-owned rental buildings that house low-income tenants in exchange for federal subsidies paid to the building's owner. 27 These owners charge a limited amount of rent and receive federal subsidies meant to fill the gap between the rent payment and the amount needed to ensure the housing's financially viability. The owner generally receives up to 110% of fair market rent, offering a larger profit margin than the owner would earn without the subsidy. 28 Begun in 1974, such Section 8 housing today shelters nearly three times as many households as public housing does. 29 The other major federal program that enlists private landlords is the low-income housing tax credit program, which has created approximately 2.5 million units since its inception in 1986. 30 The program encourages deep-pocket investors to channel funds toward affordable housing purposes in exchange for credits that reduce their federal tax liability. 31 The housing is developed, owned, and operated by entities created specifically for Nov. 20, 2014) ; NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 26, § § 1.2.5.1, 1.2.5.4, & 1.2.5.5. The latest privatization initiative, known as the Rental Assistance Demonstration program or RAD, see infra note 49, makes changes to the existing PBV and PBRA programs in order to make the tenants' experiences more like that of traditional public housing, see infra pp. 770-01 and supra note 2. For this reason, RAD PBV and RAD PBRA are both included in the category of "privatized public housing" as used in this article, see supra note 1, although they will eventually be funded under Section 8 of the Act rather than under Section 9, which traditionally funds public housing. that purpose, which may be controlled by either for-profits or non-profits. 32 Although ten percent of the credits must be reserved for non-profits, 33 non-profits face special financing challenges in using tax credits effectively. 34 As support for privately-owned affordable housing has grown, funding for government-owned public housing has fallen to untenable levels. 35 Congressional appropriations were inadequate for so long that by 1998, deferred capital needs averaged $30,000 per unit, for a total of $36 billion. 36 Operational shortfalls are also extreme, with individual units underfunded, on average, by an estimated $900 in 2012 alone. 37 Decades of insufficient funding and political support have caused the public housing inventory to shrink. 38 Over 260,000 units have been lost since the mid-1990s. 39 Throughout the late 1980's and 1990's, units were routinely declared uninhabitable due to a lack of maintenance and removed from the inventory in a process known as "demolition through neglect." 40 Between 1995 and 2010, an additional 150,000 units were lost, 41 with 50,000 of those units intentionally destroyed without replacement under a privatization program known as HOPE VI. 42 The vast majority of existing units is now over thirty years old, 43 and between 10,000 and 15,000 units are estimated to be lost each year due to inadequate appropriations. 44 as 30,000 people per year will permanently lose their public housing benefits due to attrition of the housing stock. 45 Although the federal government bears responsibility for housing for millions of low-income people, many of whom are elderly, disabled, have children, and/or suffer from chronic health concerns, 46 it has not committed the funding necessary to meet this responsibility. 47 Consequently, public housing has been suffering a slow death by financial starvation.
B. Privatized Public Housing
Privatization's primary benefit is that it offers a politically feasible alternative to this scenario, in part because since private landlords enjoy access to a broader range of financing sources. While most government landlords must rely solely on appropriations dollars to meet capital needs, private owners can supplement those dollars with other types of financing, such as commercial bank loans and equity raised from Wall Street investors through the low-income housing tax credit program. 48 Federal appropriations for operating needs are also expected to flow more generously to private owners than to government landlords because of privatization's relative popularity among lawmakers. 49 In short, privatization is widely viewed as the only politically viable option for raising desperately needed funds for both capital and operating purposes. 50 The relative willingness of Congress to subsidize private landlords as compared to government landlords is one reason that privatization has flourished in the past two decades. From 1993 to 2010, the HOPE VI program dedicated over $6.1 billion to rebuild 45 56 While RAD is not without controversy and critics, it appears likely to govern the future of public housing. It is the third iteration of a substantially similar program promoted by HUD since 2010, and HUD Secretary Julián Castro has characterized it as the "answer" for many communities. 57 Even if RAD expands, not all public housing will be privatized, but if the early numbers are any indication, a very significant portion will be.
Since RAD is presently in a demonstration phase, Congress has mandated a study to assess its effect on residents, among other things. 58 This study presents a crucial opportunity to evaluate and reform the program before it expands further. 59 An assessment should include an exploration of privatization's effect on certain persistent and challenging matters of public housing policy. The discussion below briefly assesses privatization's impact on certain key policy concerns, specifically, economic efficiency, long-term affordability, racial segregation, and place-based deprivations, although this analysis unfortunately cannot address these complex controversies in depth or address other important aspects of affordable housing policy. 60 
Economic Efficiency
Perhaps the most common justification for privatization is that private actors provide better services at a lower cost to taxpayers than governmental entities. 61 For-profit actors are often presumed to possess more expertise in service delivery and to be more motivated to act efficiently due to their need to win clients in a competitive marketplace. Such assumptions can be challenged on the grounds that competitive market conditions promoting economic efficiency do not necessarily exist in the subsidized housing industry, as discussed in more detail below. 62 Nevertheless, some argue that private landlords can hardly do worse than government ones, given the shockingly poor conditions 63 of some government-run public housing, and egregious instances of mismanagement and corruption among some public housing officials. 64 The comparative efficiency of private landlords is a popular refrain in both scholarly and public discourse about public housing. In the 1990s, legal scholars argued for privatization based in part on studies showing that privately-owned Section 8 housing consumed 58 significantly fewer appropriations dollars per unit than government-owned public housing. 65 The findings of these studies continue to influence today's debates. The contemporary housing finance market, however, has evolved with such complexity that appropriations figures do not tell the full story. A HUD study from 2000 indicated that half of all public housing units in fact cost less than a Section 8 voucher, with costs varying greatly depending on the agency's size and possibly its geographic location. 66 Moreover, most studies compare only direct appropriations for the Section 8 program and the public housing program, while neglecting to account for other costs that may be indirectly borne by taxpayers. Section 8 capital needs are often met through federally-guaranteed bank loans and/or federal low income housing tax credits, 67 for example, neither of which are costfree to taxpayers and which in some cases may cost more than direct capital grants to local governmental agencies. 68 Other factors also make these studies unreliable measures of the programs' true value. The studies acknowledge a lack of comprehensive and consistent data 69 and also note that the Section 8 and public housing programs offer different substantive benefits, the comparative value of which are not reflected in analyses that focus on economic cost alone. 70 Moreover, recent studies offer some competing evidence that government-owned housing (also known as "conventional" public housing) simply does not always cost more than privately-owned housing, at least given how privatization has been implemented to date. 71 The HOPE VI program was found to cost significantly more, for example, than 71. An analysis of the economic efficiency of privatized public housing should also consider the fact that a significant for-profit industry has developed with respect to these programs, which means that of the total dollars invested in housing today, a greater portion is dedicated to profit or fees paid to developers, financial institutions, both conventional public housing and other forms of privately owned, federally subsidized housing. 72 A 2010 HUD study calculated that direct subsidies for a RAD-like program would cost taxpayers $700-$1000 more per unit per year than what HUD had just requested in appropriations dollars to run the housing conventionally. 73 In sum, in the context of public housing, the common presumption that privatized services are less costly for taxpayers is certainly contestable.
Long-Term Affordability for Residents
All housing programs must consider fundamental questions of who should be housed 74 and how affordable the housing should be. Public housing rent payments have long been capped at 30% of income, 75 with all new admissions reserved for people earning 80% or less of area median income and 40% of admissions further reserved for those earning 30% or less of area median income. 76 Thus, federal policy reserves much of public housing for the extremely poor. 77 Some genuine concerns exist, however, about whether privatized housing will remain accessible to those least likely to be able to secure other forms of housing.
One concern is that residents may need to pay more of their limited income toward rent under the RAD program. 78 A fast-food cook in Memphis with one child who earns $15,000 annually and pays no taxes might, after paying rent for a conventional public housing unit, have approximately $28 dollars per day remaining to cover all other living expenses. 79 Even a small rent increase under RAD may be too great to bear for residents consultants, financial brokers, and lawyers. Even local agencies earn "fees" from privatization projects, although unlike fees paid to for-profit entities, these funds must be rechanneled into other affordable housing purposes. See, e.g., Melody Simmons, Graziano Offers More Details on Sale of Public Housing to Developers, BALT. BREW (Mar. 13, 2014, 12:05 PM), https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2014/03/13/graziano-offers-more-details-onsale-of-public-housing-to-developers/ (stating that "about $10 million of the expected $27 million earned by HABC is "developer fees" under the sale and financing contracts would be returned to HABC to spend on other public housing sites, the commissioner disclosed at the hearing").
72. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 66, at 3 (noting that each HOPE VI unit cost federal taxpayers significantly more, on average, in direct taxpayer subsidies, than a conventional public housing unit); CZERWINSKI ET AL., supra note 67, at 148 (finding HOPE VI to be the most costly of the five federal housing production programs studied). 77. 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(2) (2014); see also Green, supra note 15, at 737-38 (noting that local agencies sought to admit higher-income people, in part to increase revenue; while courts found this to be legal, Congress responded in 1992 by statutorily restricting admissions to lower-income people).
DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., Estimates of the Costs and Debt Leveraging Potential of Converting Public Housing to Long-Term Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance Contacts
78. Rent increases are clearly contemplated as a possibility under RAD, although any rent increases will be gradually phased in in an attempt to mitigate the burden on residents. A second concern is that private landlords may use their discretion to set admissions criteria that will bar many otherwise-eligible individuals from the housing. Private and public owners alike generally must admit all who qualify under federal and local standards, but also retain the right to screen for such things as credit checks, alcohol abuse, "poor housekeeping" skills, prior landlord references, and eviction and rent payment history, 80 among other things. 81 Such standards can bar access to public housing for those are least able to secure other shelter, and who therefore are more likely to rely on public housing to avoid homelessness. The Urban Institute classified at least 40% of residents at five Chicago sites as "hard to house," meaning that their ability to find suitable shelter outside of the public housing program was severely restricted due to low income and other factors, such as lack of a high school degree or involvement with the criminal justice system. 82 Another study found that Chicago residents reported a "stunning" frequency of health problems that turn simple daily living activities into challenges. 83 The concern is that private landlords may exercise their screening discretion in ways that bar such individuals from accessing public housing. Selective admission of "easy" tenants, along with the aggressive eviction of residents viewed as more challenging or who might consume more resources, is popularly known as "creaming." 84 Even governmental landlords engage in creaming, 85 and the problem is exacerbated when discretionary screening authority is coupled with the profit-motive and the absence of a public-sector motivation to "serve all." Creaming by private landlords under the HOPE VI program drew national criticism. 86 86. During a House hearing before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, Dr. Edward G. Goetz, Director, Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, and Professor, Urban and Regional Planning, confirmed that during the HOPE VI program, private actors used screening criteria that were "generally much stricter" than those used in conventional public housing. Academic Perspectives, supra note 42. U.S. Representative and Committee Chairwoman Maxine Waters inquired as to "[w]hy would private developers be deciding guaranteeing that current residents will not undergo heightened screening standards in order to be re-admitted. 87 However, future applicants who are hard-to-house are likely to be screened out, and all who are admitted may be at a higher risk of eviction. Furthermore, creaming raises concerns not only because it excludes individuals, but also because it can exclude certain housing projects. Properties in relatively good physical condition and in marketable locations are more likely to attract financing from private banks and investors, which may exclude properties from gaining assistance. 88 A third concern about privatized projects is the longevity of their affordability. Some attempts have been made to ensure that privatized public housing is as "permanently" affordable as conventional public housing. For example, federal approval is required to sell or close privatized housing and to lift affordability restrictions before the contract term expires. 89 Some local agencies also retain property rights enabling them to take back possession of the property once the contract with the private landlord expires, 90 which provides a potential path to long-term preservation, although it does not guarantee that the necessary funding will be available.
Despite these efforts, privatization poses specific and significant risks to long-term affordability. RAD's affordability period is shorter than that of conventional public housing. 91 Private owners may exit the public housing program once their contractual obligations end, and may even deliberately breach their contracts with the goal of escaping from their public housing obligations before the contract term expires, 92 which it may be tempted to do if converting the property to a market-rate use will be profitable. Moreover, given that stewardship over public housing is no longer the obligation of governmental agencies, lawmakers may find it even easier to further reduce funding or even abandon the program outright.
how we spend our government money to house?"). In sum, privatization raises unsettling concerns about whether the housing will remain accessible for people with few other options, and whether it eases the ability of landlords and lawmakers to exit from public housing obligations.
3. Segregation and Race-and Place-Based Inequality Finally, privatization does little to address one of the most deeply troubling aspects of the public housing program: its role in creating and perpetuating racial segregation, both when discrimination was legal and after it was outlawed. 93 Housing segregation has contributed to the deep deprivations suffered by poor, minority communities, including the lack of fundamental services like public safety, education, economic opportunities, transportation, and consumer services. 94 These matters can be explored only briefly here, but must be mentioned as a critical part of the complex debate about the future of public housing. Privatization initiatives have approached racial segregation and race-and place-based inequality in different ways. The HOPE VI program intentionally sought to "deconcentrate poverty" by replacing most of the public housing with housing for people with higher incomes. This "mixed-income" approach drew harsh criticism for many reasons, 95 including for linking its theory of neighborhood improvement with the removal of poor black residents. 96 HOPE VI's successor program, the Choice Neighborhoods Program, responded with a more promising strategy that minimizes displacement of public housing residents 97 and invests in area schools and crime-prevention programs. 98 Privatization initiatives under the RAD programs take yet another approach and offer a "mobility" option. 99 that residents may relocate and apply their subsidies to other housing units in other jurisdictions. 100 The mobility option theoretically enables residents to move from communities lacking adequate services into so-called "neighborhoods of opportunity." 101 However, areas that offer adequate services often lack private landlords who will accept the subsidies, 102 and without an adequate supply of housing, the usefulness of the mobility option is limited. 103 Moreover, residents also simply may not wish to move from their homes and into new communities where they may fear harassment, stigma, and isolation on the basis of race and income. 104 Recent efforts to address race-and place-based deprivations through the Choice Neighborhoods and RAD programs are not insignificant. Without additional reforms, however, their impact on these complex and deeply entrenched problems are likely to be nominal.
C. Public Housing Protections
Privatization appears to provide little or no resolution to some of the most challenging and troubling issues raised by the public housing program. Yet privatization also appears, at present, to be the only politically viable future for the program. In part, this is because a compromise has been struck that accepts the limitations of privatization in exchange for the preservation of certain rights and benefits for residents. The following sections discuss these benefits, their doctrinal origins, and their legal and policy significance.
Some of the most valuable benefits of public housing include greater security in tenancy 105 and rights to participate in governance and policy-making. 106 These benefits do not exist in private unsubsidized rental housing and exist only to a limited extent in other federal rental housing programs. While these benefits are not always well respected even in the conventional public housing program, Congress has deemed them to be so important that it has demanded that private owners continue to provide them. A hypothetical narrative offers a backdrop for discussing the nature of these benefits, their origins, and their importance. Imagine a faded complex of garden-style apartments, one or two stories in height and set around a spare courtyard. The building has continuously been owned and operated by the local housing agency as public housing since it was built many decades ago. Years of federal funding shortfalls have led to deferred maintenance, and the building is in dire need of major capital repairs.
Assume that this particular community reflects national averages for the public housing population at large. Seven out of eight residents are elderly, disabled, and/or responsible for small children. 108 The average household income is $13,724, even though wages are a major source of income for 28% of households. 109 Only twelve percent of households depend on welfare as a major source of income. 110 The residents recently elected representatives to the building's resident council, which under federal law has the right to consult with the local agency as to how their housing is run. The residents elected Mrs. J to the council, along with other leaders who have been active in complaining to the landlord about the building's persistent mice, bedbug, and cockroach infestations. Mrs. J and the other council representatives plan to use their positions to advocate for better housing conditions.
The complex is selected to participate in a privatization program, which means that its federal funding stream can be supplemented with other kinds of financing. Agency staff has no expertise in complex real estate finance matters, so it hires a private real estate developer to assemble a financing package and oversee renovations.
The government's interest in the property makes it relatively attractive to privatesector banks and investors. The developer successfully arranges for a commercial bank loan to fund capital needs, which the bank secures through a mortgage. The company also raises equity through the tax credit program, through which investors contribute funds for renovations in exchange for significant tax savings.
To meet tax credit requirements, title to the building is transferred to a for-profit company controlled by the real estate developer. To safeguard their investment, the investors and the bank demand that the company be run by people with sophisticated knowledge of the tax credit program. Since agency staff cannot fill that role, the real estate developer assumes a controlling interest in the for-profit company that owns the building. It also hires an affiliated for-profit company to manage the building's day-to-day operations, such as addressing routine maintenance needs, collecting rents, and handling evictions.
All residents have the opportunity under federal law to return to the building after renovations, and all do. They find that the roof leaks less and cosmetic repairs have been done, but also that the vermin have returned. Residents continue to lobby for better conditions, and just as the leases of Mrs. J and other resident council members are about to housing-residents-protest-terrible-living-conditions-108326.
108. expire, each receives a notice that his or her lease will not be renewed. According to the landlord, Mrs. J. has repeatedly failed to pay her rent on time. Other council members are accused of disturbing other residents and failing to keep guests from writing graffiti. 111 Mrs. J and the other resident leaders dispute these allegations and believe that the landlord is refusing to renew their leases in retaliation for their activism. Since Mrs. J is disabled, suffers from a range of health problems, and has limited daily mobility, she is panicked that she has only thirty days to find alternative housing that is affordable, close to medical, transportation, and social services, and close to her daughter, on whom she relies a great deal. This brief narrative illustrates a number of concepts. It describes how a public housing complex might typically transition from governmental ownership and management to private control. It also illustrates certain protections commonly afforded to public housing residents and that are intended to be preserved as the housing becomes privatized. These protections can be categorized into two broad groups, referred to as "security-in-tenancy" protections and "participation rights."
Security-In-Tenancy Protections
Security-in-tenancy protections are legal assurances that a person may remain in her housing for the foreseeable future if she abides by the rules. In short, security in tenancy means that a person cannot be forced to vacate her housing unless good cause exists for terminating the tenancy, and these protections provide stability and reassurance that the resident will not lose shelter through no fault of her own. Security-in-tenancy rights come in various forms, and among the most crucial are continued occupancy and grievance procedures.
a. Continued Occupancy
Assume momentarily that Mrs. J lives in a private rental building that does not participate in any federal housing program. Mrs. J could go to court to disprove the landlord's allegation that she did not pay her rent, since all states require a court hearing prior to eviction. 112 Most states also offer a statutory protection against retaliatory eviction. 113 Even if she is successful in the courtroom, however, Mrs. J would not secure a right to renew her lease. A tenant in private housing simply has no right to continued occupancy; a private landlord may decline to re-let a unit when the lease term ends without cause and for any reason that is not illegally discriminatory.
Fortunately for Mrs. J, because she lives in public housing, she does have a legal 118 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that a resident's property interest extends beyond the initial term of the lease in Joy v. Daniels, holding that a contractual end to the tenancy is overridden by due process requirements, which demand good cause for declining to renew a public housing lease upon expiration. 119 Joy's holding is now echoed in federal regulations. 120 While some legal scholars have argued that the right to continued occupancy should also apply to private landlords as a logical extension of the "revolution" in private landlord-tenant law, this has been done only in a handful of jurisdictions. 121 Congress and HUD have also declined to apply this right to Section 8 housing. Thus, the right to continued occupancy upon lease expiration is a valuable benefit that is unique to public housing.
b. Grievance Procedures
Another security-in-tenancy benefit to be preserved in privatized public housing is the opportunity to grieve nearly any adverse act taken by one's landlord. 122 Grievance procedures provide a forum for dispute resolution that is more flexible and accessible than judicial proceedings and thus offer public housing residents greater security against eviction and other adverse events.
Grievance procedures offer both informal discussions as well as a more formal hearing. 123 Mrs. J, for example, has the legal right to first speak informally with her housing manager about her alleged nonpayment of rent. 124 If the landlord does not change course, Mrs. J can then appeal the outcome of the meeting through a more formal hearing, 125 administered by an "impartial" person selected in accordance with a process approved by the residents. 126 Mrs. J has the right to have a lawyer or other representative at the hearing, at which she can examine the rules and regulations, examine records allegedly showing her nonpayment, cross-examine the staff person to whom she handed her check every month, and present her bank records to refute the landlord's grounds for eviction. 127 She could also describe her activism efforts, as well as the landlord's refusal to renew the leases of other resident activists and call witnesses to support her theory of retaliation. 128 Both the informal and formal processes must be documented in writing, 129 and the decision of the hearing officer is binding on the landlord. 130 If Mrs. J remains unsatisfied, she can still pursue a court action. 131 As the narrative illustrates, one benefit of grievance procedures is access to convenient, low-cost avenues for dispute resolution prior to eviction and other adverse housing actions. The procedures offer third-party adjudication in a setting that does not require legal expertise, since rules of evidence, standing requirements, and other technical courtroom requirements do not apply. 132 Grievance processes can be used to facilitate dispute resolution without the time, cost, legal expertise, and emotional toll of court proceedings, and participants are free to negotiate creative and flexible remedies that suit their particular circumstances. 133 A further benefit is that a resident may confront a manager with a broader range of concerns than a court proceeding might entertain. Residents can grieve not only evictions but virtually any adverse action or inaction by the landlord. 134 Grievances thus provide a 133. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1997) ("The collaborative claim that problem solving tends to produce higher-quality rules rests upon the belief that unanticipated or novel solutions are likely to emerge from face-to-face deliberative engagement among knowledgeable parties who would never otherwise share information or devise solutions together.").
134. NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 26, § 10.2.2.3 ("[A] grievance must relate to PHA action or inaction concerning either the lease agreement or PHA regulations," which encompasses "almost every housing concern") (citing 24 C.F.R. § § 966.50, 966.53(a) (2014)). TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:759 forum for working out a broad array of landlord/tenant conflicts, not just those presenting a legally cognizable cause of action. Grievance rights derive from Constitutional due process rights articulated during the due process revolution. In Thorpe v. Housing Authority, a resident was evicted immediately after being elected as president of a resident organization. 135 Before the U.S. Supreme Court could confront the First Amendment concern, HUD issued administrative guidance requiring procedural due process hearings much like those required in Goldberg, which were then refined through negotiations among HUD, legal advocates for residents, and a group of local housing agencies. 136 The principle that grievance procedures can be invoked with respect to any adverse action, not just evictions, also derives from procedural due process.
137 Escalera, applying Goldberg, held that grievance procedures are triggered by the assessment of minor fines against residents, 138 establishing residents' right to invoke grievances to address a wide range of issues. The principles of Thorpe and Escalera set forth the basic infrastructure for today's grievance procedures and are now codified by statute. 139 Grievance rights are a key component of the due process protections afforded to public housing residents. Yet they are not always appropriate or effective in resolving rights concerns. Low-income and minority residents face many of the same structural barriers in grievance procedures as they do in more formal adjudicative settings, 140 but grievance procedures lack the more robust procedural safeguards of those fora. Moreover, the effectiveness of grievance procedures depends heavily on the personal willingness of the landlord or hearing officer to fairly consider the matter, and the inherent power imbalance between resident and landlord inevitably colors the proceedings. 141 In addition, residents risk revealing information that can later be used against them in court.
Such concerns are not uncommon to alternative dispute resolution processes. 142 Despite these limitations, however, some advocates still argue for greater use of grievance procedures in the subsidized housing context. 143 
c. The Right to Return
In the hypothetical narrative, Mrs. J also benefited from a security-in-tenancy benefit known as "the right to return." 144 The right to return means that residents who are displaced due to renovations must be offered an opportunity to move back into the refurbished housing. 145 Unique to public housing, this right is one of its most sought-after benefits, and recent privatization programs offer a nearly universal right to return. 146 The right to return resonates strongly among public housing and other low-income communities in part because of a long history of their displacement by governmental programs supporting activities such as urban renewal and the construction of highway and sports stadia. 147 Early public housing privatization initiatives are part of this history. HOPE VI's "mixed-income" policy displaced thousands of low-income black residents who could not return to the renovated sites because much of the new housing was reserved for higher-income, often white, residents. 148 Private landlords imposed stricter screening requirements for the renovated units, further excluding many former residents from returning. 149 Those displaced often lacked adequate support in finding replacement housing and adjusting to the loss of their homes, social networks, and services such as familiar schools, doctors, and transportation lines. 150 at HOPE VI sites around the country protested strenuously to secure the right at the local level, 151 and advocates fought for decades for a change in federal policy. The intensity of these battles reflects the importance of the right to return, as does its reinstatement in later privatization programs. Security in tenancy protections offer both functional and emotional benefits. 152 They guard against involuntary ejection from one's home and the disruption of one's social networks, daily functions, and emotional well-being. 153 These protections are especially important for those who are disabled, elderly, or have children, who collectively make up eighty-seven percent of the public housing population, 154 and for individuals who are otherwise "hard to house," who face challenges in finding replacement housing that is affordable, accommodates their physical needs, and is convenient to essential medical, educational, and social services. 155 For many who live in public housing, security in their tenancy is not a mere convenience, but a critical safeguard against homelessness and against the harshness of private lease law. 156 
Participation Rights
Benefits available to public housing residents also include participation rights, or rights to provide input to one's landlord on matters that affects one's living conditions. 157 Participation rights have roots in principles of due process, although today's participation rights extend well beyond Constitutional minimums. For example, Mrs. J's resident council must be "recognized" by the public housing agency under federal requirements, 158 which qualifies it for funding for education, training, and other activities supporting resident involvement in the governance of their housing. 159 Public housing rules also encourage the establishment of formal channels of communication with agency officials. 160 Residents have formal notice-and-comment rights with respect to plans to sell, renovate, or privatize their housing 161 and with respect to proposed changes in lease terms, rent requirements, and house rules. 162 Residents are also entitled to fill one seat on the local agency's board of directors. 163 Mrs. J and her fellow residents might well benefit from these types of participation rights. They might use their funding to support community organizing trainings and protests against the evictions of the resident leaders. 164 The resident council could employ its federally-mandated channels of communication with agency officials to publicize the retaliatory evictions. 165 Participation rights must be viewed with some skepticism, as they provide only for communication between residents and decision-makers, and do not guarantee residents any control or power over decisions. 166 Residents' bargaining power in such settings is often limited by race, their status as beneficiaries, and a lack of traditional markers of credibility such as education. Nevertheless, participation rights remain valuable, as they can increase residents' collective negotiating power in advocating for better housing conditions. 167 Rights to federal funding and to information disclosure are especially useful in facilitating resident mobilization and collective action to promote change. Security-in-tenancy rights and participation rights are largely unique to public housing, although other low-income tenants share many of the same needs and interests 169 and may deserve the same protections. 170 Private public housing landlords can, however, justifiably be asked do more for tenants than other landlords, given the special benefits that they receive through the program. 171 Subsidies provide more than fair market rent, for example, and landlords often gain long-term control over housing assets at no cost or at a steeply reduced cost.
172 They may enjoy greater access to financing, since lenders and investors find government-backed projects especially attractive, and can earn substantial fees for managing renovations. They are also relieved of the burden of finding new tenants when vacancies occur, since public housing waiting lists often far outnumber available units.
In short, landlords benefit from privatization programs and, as part of their bargained-for exchange with the government, are obligated to promote the Constitutional and democratic interests of low-income residents.
III. PUBLICIZATION, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS
"The issue for us is enforcement [of public housing standards and regulations]. . . . The promise is that the properties are to be managed like public housing, but we don't know what that means." -David A. Prater, fair housing attorney, Maryland Disability Law Center
173
That political will exists to impose publicization and extend public housing protections is perhaps surprising, 174 given the program's unpopularity among lawmakers and the programmatic complexity that publicization adds. The intent to publicize, however, has been quite clearly stated by Congress. All units under the HOPE VI and Choice Neighborhoods programs must be "developed, operated, and maintained in accordance with the requirements of the Act relating to public housing," 175 174. See Freeman, supra note 5, at 1329-35 (noting that governments may lack motivation to publicize). 175. 42 U.S.C. § 1437z-7(c) (2014). The statute further clarifies that any statutory reference to "public housing" includes privately-owned units assisted by alternative financing, such as those developed under the lowincome housing tax credit equity. 
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6 and 9 of the Act," 176 which address certain security-in-tenancy and participation protections. A host of statutory, regulatory, and administrative declarations further elaborate upon these protections, 177 which are in turn made applicable to private owners via contract, just as privatization scholars have envisioned. 178 In all four programs, contracts between HUD and private landlords require landlord compliance with all applicable statutory, regulatory, contractual, and subregulatory administrative guidance. 179 HUD contracts also place responsibility on local agencies to cause private landlords to comply with the rules. 180 HUD thus generally has privity of contract with both the private owner and the local agency, and may exercise contractual remedies against either in the event of breach or noncompliance.
181 HUD's contracts also empower HUD to exercise an extensive array of monitoring and enforcement tactics, as discussed below.
182
Despite the sweeping language of these contracts, they do not assure that publicization will occur. Before analyzing the shortcomings of the contractual scheme itself, it is useful to examine the need for affirmative acts of publicization through legislative and contractual means. As discussed below, publicization is necessary because neither Constitutional doctrine nor market-based incentives serves to sufficiently motivate private actors to carry out public policy goals. Affirmative acts of publicization can serve to fill in gaps in Constitutional doctrine. 183 A gap exists in that private actors are not bound to respect Constitutional rights merely because they receive federal payment to carry out activities once conducted by the government; 184 some form of state action must exist in order for a private actor to be bound by Constitutional requirements. The state action doctrine has been roundly criticized as lacking a coherent basis in principle. 185 This point is illustrated by the fact that, according to case law and agency guidance, the state action doctrine requires Section 8 landlords to provide certain protections traditionally required of government actors, but not others, yet does not provide any clear basis for distinguishing between the two. 186 For instance, courts have held that in Section 8 housing, termination of a tenancy during the lease term implicates state action and requires due process, but termination of a tenancy upon expiration of the lease has not been treated as state action. 187 Similarly, any adverse action by a governmental landlord triggers due process protections, while only certain adverse actions by a private Section 8 landlord have been deemed to trigger those protections. 188 The state action doctrine does not adequately explain the basis for such distinctions. What is clear, however, is that the doctrine certainly does not require private landlords to provide all of the public housing benefits that governmental landlords must provide. Therefore, in order to bind private actors to Constitutional norms, some other form of legal obligation must be created. Statutory and contractual publicization mandates can serve this role.
Other Justifications
Some benefits are not of Constitutional significance, 189 but their preservation is still desirable for public policy reasons. In such cases, strong acts of publicization are necessary to coerce private actors into providing these benefits. It can be presumed that private actors will be reluctant to provide services that consume resources and reduce profit. 190 Public housing benefits fall into this category, as grievance procedures require time, secure ten- ancies mean less landlord discretion to evict residents who demand more managerial attention, and robust participation rights can encourage residents to demand higher-quality services. 191 These benefits may have little chance of preservation in a profit-driven system, justifying a robust publicization scheme.
A counterargument might be that publicization is unnecessary, as private landlords will voluntarily offer enhanced benefits in order to more effectively compete for tenants. 192 In this view, if tenants value the benefits, they will seek out landlords who offer them and reject those that do not, and thus the profit-motive will encourage landlords to provide public housing benefits. The flaw in this argument is that competition for tenant dollars does not exist in the public housing sector, since low-income tenants have few or no alternative housing options and little or no ability to reject landlords who provide dissatisfactory service. 193 As Wendy Netter Epstein explains, systemic market failures exist in the realm of public-private contracting, including a lack of competition, which lead to contracts that do not internalize the full costs of providing public services and causes beneficiaries to bear the excess cost in the form of poor service. 194 A competitive market could conceivably be created if landlords with stronger rights records received preferences in the award of public housing subsidy contracts, but this is not present practice. 195 Another counterargument against strong forms of publicization may be that even government actors routinely disregard public housing rights, and that private landlords should not be held to higher standards than public ones. Rights violations do occur throughout the conventional public housing system, since government landlords, while not primarily profit-seeking, 196 still have incentives to save money, evict challenging residents, and tamp down participation. 197 Governmental status alone certainly does not guarantee the sincere and dedicated service of public needs, and HUD and some local agencies are known for having weak records on rights. 198 On the other hand, that some public entities perform poorly does not excuse similarly poor performance by private actors. Rather, TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:759 it only illustrates the need to attend with more care to rights enforcement in the privatized setting, since private actors have even stronger incentives to skimp on rights 199 and lack a historical commitment to serving public purposes.
In sum, affirmative acts of publicization are necessary to supplement Constitutional doctrine and to combat the threat to rights posed by the profit-motive. In the public housing context, such affirmative acts already exist in the form of Congressional mandates and contractual obligations imposed by HUD on private actors. Public housing rights are far from secure, however.
B. The Publicization Mandate's Inherent Vulnerabilities
Despite publicization, public housing rights remain vulnerable in a number of ways. One risk is that if political will to publicize weakens, crucial protections may be eliminated by Congress. To date, RAD has been implemented solely through appropriations bills, 200 meaning that the publicization mandate can simply be removed from future bills. Even if RAD is eventually codified, the statutory protections presently guaranteed could be excised by Congress at a later date.
The history of public housing privatization provides a cautionary tale. During the early days of the HOPE VI program, federal law required that any unit demolished must be rebuilt. 201 This "one-for-one replacement" rule essentially guaranteed all residents a right to return and also ensured that privatization would not reduce the overall number of affordable units. 202 As the program expanded, however, Congress first suspended, 203 then repealed the rule, 204 paving the way for widespread displacement and the loss of approximately 50,000 units. 205 The withdrawal of this critical protection fundamentally changed the nature of the program, and this experience underscores the fragility of the present promise to protect residents as privatization takes place.
Another vulnerability exists in that the current publicization scheme preserves only rights granted to residents by statute, but not those spelled out in regulatory or subregulatory mandates, 206 where much of the substance of public housing law is found. Such benefits might thus be withdrawn with relatively ease by HUD in the future. Moreover, Congress has authorized the HUD Secretary to waive statutory requirements as "necessary" for RAD to be "effective." 207 Since HUD does not generally submit waiver requests to public notice or debate, 208 such waivers could quietly eviscerate non-statutory protections
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with little scrutiny.
209
The problem of administrative undermining is illustrated by recent HUD actions. Current administrative guidance suggests that private landlords in one program need not follow grievance procedures, 210 despite clear Congressional directive to the contrary. At best, this guidance is ambiguous and misleadingly encourages noncompliance, and at worst, it deliberately undermines Congressional intent. Clearly, even strongly-worded publicization mandates can be withdrawn or undermined, and experience suggests that the present mandate is indeed vulnerable.
C. Weak Frameworks for Monitoring and for the Exercise of Remedies
Even assuming that the publicization mandate remains in full force, it is still unlikely to effectively preserve public housing rights. This is due to critical weaknesses in the existing accountability framework. Richard Stewart defined three elements that are fundamental to effective accountability mechanisms: "(1) a specified accounter, who is subject to being called into account; (2) a specific account holder, who can require that the accounter render account for his performance; and (3) the ability and authority of the account holder to impose sanctions or mobilize other remedies for deficient performance by the accounter." 211 To a casual observer, HUD's contractual scheme appears to contain all three elements, as it provides HUD with broad monitoring and enforcement authority against private landlords. A closer look, however, reveals that the monitoring and enforcement system is deeply inadequate.
The Devaluation of Security-in-Tenancy and Participation Rights
The first of Stewart's accountability elements, that the accounter be subject to being called into account, is nearly absent from the existing monitoring scheme. HUD reporting requirements are notoriously burdensome, and yet they fail to make any inquiry into security-in-tenancy and participation rights. Even though HUD is statutorily required to evaluate 212 whether each local agency has provided participation opportunities for residents, 213 HUD's assessment tool simply does not evaluate this factor. Security-in-tenancy rights receive even less attention, and are simply absent from . The RAD Notice requires grievance processes in the context of a "PHA (as owner)." RAD Notice, supra note 53, at 42-43. The term "PHA" is formally defined as either a governmental entity or a private company, id. at 11, although the term "PHA (as owner)" is not defined.
The term "PHA (as owner)" could be construed as referring only to a governmental entity, since the phrase "(as owner)" appears to be an attempt to distinguish between a local agency acting as landlord, and a local agency acting as regulator or funder. The phrase "(as owner)" would presumably not be necessary if the term "PHA" in this context referred to private entities. 215 to file numerous monthly and annual reports, 216 to submit to independent audits, 217 and to submit to on-site reviews, 218 among other things. Yet HUD collects practically no information about security-in-tenancy and participation rights no. 219 In one program, for example, HUD assesses performance with respect to eight compliance categories. 220 Four categories address financial and administrative concerns, and three assess whether the landlord filled out required reports. 221 Of the hundreds of questions asked, not a single one inquires into security-in-tenancy or participation rights. At best, these rights might be covered under the generic category of "resident complaints" concerning "non-life-threatening conditions." 222 Current monitoring schemes thus seem highly unlikely to uncover potential rights violations simply because they do not ask about them. Moreover, even if problems were discovered, it is not assured that HUD would take any enforcement action in response. A 2011 Inspector General audit found grave deficiencies in HUD's enforcement of one Section 8 initiative, concluding that HUD failed to impose fines on noncompliant landlords and deemed reports satisfactory simply if timely submitted, without assessing whether the contents of the report met any substantive standard of quality. 223 HUD's systemic monitoring efforts are supplemented by the administrative complaint process, 224 which enables residents to initiate complaints, but this system also suffers some crucial weaknesses. It places the burden of raising a complaint on residents, even though private landlords are not always required to share "know-your-rights" information with residents, 225 and even though no regulations or guidance explain how residents can effectively file a complaint. 226 Perhaps most significantly, any HUD response to administrative complaints is elective. HUD reportedly does sometimes remedy violations that are obvious and undisputed, 227 but this leaves a great number of situations unaddressed.
Notably, participation rights have been singled out for monitoring and enforcement in the context of one particular HUD program, where subregulatory guidance not only requires that HUD respond to administrative complaints but also authorizes HUD to levy sanctions against noncompliant owners, including civil fines and debarment from participating in HUD programs. 228 Even in this context, however, HUD's responsiveness to complaints is reportedly inconsistent. 229
The Inadequacy of Remedies
The second element of Stewart's accountability framework is that an account holder must have the power to exercise remedies in the event of deficient performance. 230 Kimberly Brown explains that where private contractors are delegated power and funding derived from the public, but lack accountability to the electorate, the federal executive branch must retain termination power over the contractor in order to meet its Constitutional obligations. 231 In the public housing context, the minimum requirements articulated by Stewart and Brown appear to be met, as HUD can theoretically exercise a range of contractual remedies against private landlords, including termination, 232 and HUD may generally exercise any permissible remedy against a private owner. 233 Gaps occur, however, as HUD cannot be compelled to act. 234 Moreover, even if HUD chose to enforce, significant challenges exist to the effective exercise of remedies. (2013) (arguing that the "take Care" clause of the Constitution "obligates the president to ensure that agencies enforce the rights and duties created by Congress"). 232. As discussed, HUD generally has contractual rights directly against a private landlord, and also can indirectly enforce by demanding that the local agency enforce its contracts against the owner. For simplicity, the discussion in the text does not distinguish between direct and indirect enforcement, although as a practical matter indirect enforcement would present additional challenges since HUD would need to successfully coerce the local agency into action, and the local agency would also need to coerce the private contractor. Three specific remedies are repeatedly emphasized in privatization contracts. 235 One is that HUD may petition a court for specific performance or an injunction. Court action is likely to be too costly to pursue, however, except where violations are repeated and egregious.
A second remedy is the reduction or termination of subsidies, which poses obvious risks. Since HUD is in a collaborative relationship with private actors and relies on them to provide services, it may shy away from enforcing in this manner. Moreover, a landlord penalized by a reduction in subsidy may simply further spend less on services rather than sacrifice profit. Severe fiscal sanctions may even threaten the project's financially viability, leading to a bankruptcy, workout, or foreclosure process that could displace residents and jeopardize long-term affordability. 236 Subsidy-reduction sanctions are so risky that residents have occasionally filed suit to prevent HUD from exercising this remedy. 237 The third contractual remedy is to remove the housing asset from the contractor's control and to place it into the hands of either a court-appointed receiver or the enforcing agency itself. 238 This remedy poses logistical challenges of identifying a receiver capable of both administering a complex array of public housing requirements and implementing widespread organizational change that will endure once the receivership ends. instituting a receivership is exponentially more complicated in a privatized context. 240 Receivers must be identified who have expertise in both complex real estate financing matters and in public housing administration, and investors and lenders may well object to ceding control over their investment and seek to block the appointment. 241 In sum, strong contractual remedies exist, but face such steep implementation challenges that they are likely to be exercised only when violations are especially egregious. In the vast majority of situations, these remedies may be too risky or costly.
Less severe remedies also exist, although they are not explicitly articulated in the contracts. HUD commonly employs intermediate-level sanctions against poor-performing local agencies, which it conceivably might also apply to private landlords. 242 For example, HUD might require a local agency to increase its reporting, meet certain performance standards within specified timelines, and require attendance at trainings. 243 Such soft incentives may spur change at local agencies, since HUD programs are often the agency's sole mission and HUD funds are often their sole source of income. Private landlords, on the other hand, may be less reliant on HUD and thus less susceptible to indirect HUD pressure.
Other intermediate-level sanctions are equally unlikely to be effective against private landlords. For example, when dealing with a poorly-performing local agency, 244 HUD might prohibit the agency from taking on new financial commitments, require it to submit any new business contracts with outside parties to HUD for approval, and impose thirdparty oversight of certain aspects of the agency's operations. 245 It is unlikely that HUD would inject itself so intrusively into private-sector business dealings, however, and TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:759 equally unlikely that private landlords would readily submit to such intrusions.
D. The Inadequacy of Alternatives to Federal Enforcement
Current federal oversight and enforcement schemes have some readily apparent weaknesses. Is greater federal involvement a necessary response? To evaluate whether effective alternatives to federal enforcement exist, it is helpful to return to the hypothetical narrative of Mrs. J.
Private Rights of Action
Were Mrs. J to seek to enforce her rights against a government landlord, her rights of action would be quite limited. She must have the personal resources to bring suit. 246 Moreover, she cannot necessarily enforce a right simply because her landlord is statutorily obligated to provide that right, since only Congress can create private rights of action to enforce federal law, 247 whether expressly or impliedly. 248 Only in limited circumstances have courts found implied private rights of action under the statute governing federal affordable housing programs 249 and its regulatory or subregulatory requirements. 250 Even assuming that Mrs. J could establish a private right of action against a government landlord, that same cause of action might not lie against a private landlord. 251 Mrs. J also has a lease with her landlord, the terms of which she could seek to enforce under contract law. However, she must have contractual privity with the landlord with respect to the rule that she wishes to enforce, and none of the HUD-drafted privatized lease forms comprehensively incorporate all public housing protections. Mrs. J's ability to bring a contract action is far from certain.
If Mrs. J lacks a private right of action granted by Congress, and also lacks a basis for a suit against her landlord in her lease, she might seek to bring a cause of action based on the third-party beneficiary doctrine. Third-party beneficiary rights would enable Mrs. J to enforce contracts executed not by her, but by HUD, the local agency, and/or the private landlord. 252 For Mrs. J to enforce these contracts as a third-party beneficiary, the contracting parties must intend for that her to have that right. 253 Few HUD contracts clearly state this intent, and where they do, other HUD contracts sometimes state a contradictory intent by explicitly denying third-party beneficiary rights. 254 Moreover, the third-party beneficiary doctrine has been inconsistently applied in the public housing context. 255 The thirdparty beneficiary doctrine is thus unreliable as a route to private enforcement.
Even assuming that a resident can state a viable cause of action, contract claims are not always well suited to resolving the problems faced by public housing residents. The right to return illustrates this point. While some residents did procure a right to return to the newly renovated housing developed under the HOPE VI program, thousands were unable to exercise their rights because the local agency failed to track them as they were relocated, and ultimately could not contact them when the housing was ready for reoccupancy. 256 Individual, post-hoc enforcement actions likely would not have helped these residents access their rights, whereas forward-looking monitoring and oversight by federal officials might have made a difference. 257 Individual enforcement actions are also unsatisfactory in this context because they may not effectively address systemic noncompliance. In adjudicating an individual resident's complaint for breach of contract, a court generally cannot assess a landlord's history of violations against other individuals or sanction a landlord for habitually flouting program requirements. In contrast, were HUD to equip itself with a robust monitoring and enforcement scheme, it could evaluate repeated or cumulative acts of noncompliance and respond accordingly.
While residents do have numerous avenues through which they may seek judicial TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:759 enforcement, these avenues are not always readily accessible or well suited to the context, and therefore should be viewed as supplements to, not as substitutes for, a comprehensive system of federal oversight.
Enforcement Through Resident Participation
It is conceivable that participation rights, if well-enforced, could provide another avenue through which residents could force private landlords to respect their rights. For a number of reasons, however, their potency is limited in the privatized setting.
A key benefit of participation rights is that they provide formal channels of communication between a local agency and resident representatives, such as through the resident council and the residents' seat on the agency's board of directors. If Mrs. J lived in conventional public housing, she could potentially use these channels to challenge the manager's systemic eviction of resident leaders, using her position on the resident council to make agency supervisors and the board of directors aware of the manager's actions. The agency, as the manager's employer, would be in a position to terminate or sanction the manager for her bad acts.
Where landlords and managers are employed by private companies, however, agency staff wields only attenuated control over their behavior. An agency cannot fire, sanction, or threaten to fire the individual, but can only seek to pressure the private company to take action against her. Thus, the lines of communication between residents and local agency officials may be significantly less likely, in a privatized setting, to improve how residents are treated. 258 Private ownership also dilutes the power of participation rights in other ways. Participation rights include legal rights to information, which is frequently useful in catalyzing mobilization efforts, through which residents act collectively to exert pressure on the landlord to change its behavior. 259 Privatization, however, means that control over individual housing projects is no longer centralized in the local agency, but dispersed among numerous private landlords. This diversity of ownership may make it more challenging to mobilize a sufficient number of residents against any one landlord. Unlike government landlords, private landlords are also generally not subject to sunshine laws 260 and may shield their principals, as private citizens, from becoming the objects of public protests. 261 explicitly been publicized and may not be protected in privatized public housing.
E. Recommendations
It seems clear that legal mandates alone are not enough to assure that publicization will take place. For rights to be preserved, Congress must demand that HUD actively protect rights through a robust monitoring and enforcement scheme. Such a mandate may be implemented by augmenting the existing RAD directive with the following italicized language: "HUD shall ensure that tenants . . . shall, at a minimum, maintain the same rights . . . as those provided under sections 6 and 9 of the Act and under HUD implementing requirements." This language imposes an affirmative obligation on HUD to preserve and protect public housing rights. It also bars HUD from undermining the publicization mandate by exempting private landlords from regulatory or subregulatory requirements applicable to governmental landlords. Waivers of certain requirements should be permitted where necessary and appropriate, but waiver requests should be subject to public noticeand-comment procedures to ensure that public housing benefits are not diluted without adequate scrutiny and justification.
A rigorous rights preservation scheme would also include the elements discussed below: expanded remedies, the integration of residents into the monitoring and enforcement scheme, and an increased role for non-profit organizations.
Expanded Remedies
Legal remedies must be reformed and expanded. Options include adopting remedies already in use in other subsidized housing contexts, such as barring noncompliant landlords from doing business with federal agencies for up to three years, 263 and specifically including rights violations as a justification for debarment. 264 In addition, when HUD or local agencies invoke their authority by imposing fines or reducing subsidies, they must simultaneously be required to increase monitoring and oversight, and provided with the funds to do so, so as to deter noncompliant owners from merely reducing services in an effort to preserve profits as financial sanctions are applied.
HUD's Office of Inspector General should also be deployed to deter and remedy rights violations. The Inspector General currently focuses its energy on the misapplication of funds by local agencies, procurement irregularities, and other activities related to protecting the federal fisc. 265 Rights violations should be given equal priority to prevent the payment of tax dollars to non-performing landlords. TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:759
Remedies exercisable directly by residents should also be enhanced. 266 HUD should unambiguously grant third-party beneficiary rights enabling residents to enforce all relevant contracts and all benefits granted to them pursuant to statute, regulation, and subregulatory guidance. The resources necessary to pursue court action will limit the number of claims brought and prevent an overburdening of the courts, while still deterring poor performers and offering a valuable avenue of relief for residents. Finally, HUD should commit to studying best practices for remedying rights violations and set clear expectations for both landlords and local agencies.
Integration of Resident Expertise
The expansion of remedies must also be accompanied by more effective triggers for the exercise of remedies. Monitoring systems should focus much more strongly on rights. This may be implemented in part through landlord self-reporting, but valuable data should also come from the residents, whose personal experiences are the ultimate test of whether rights are respected or violated.
Legal scholars have argued in other contexts for the incorporation of beneficiaries of social welfare programs into monitoring and enforcement systems. 267 Beneficiaries are stakeholders who can provide strong oversight and accountability, as well as an insiders' knowledge of what is working and what is not. 268 In light of these considerations, the fact that residents currently play no role in the monitoring and enforcement scheme seems illogical. 269 On the other hand, robust resident participation does face serious constraints. Participation is undoubtedly hindered by the dramatic power imbalance between landlords and residents, as well as by resident mistrust of participatory processes, a lack of time and other resources to commit to participatory schemes, and the discrediting of resident input on the basis of class, race, language, education level, and professional status. 270 Participatory systems must carefully and comprehensively address these barriers by incorporating multiple power-leveling mechanisms. 271 If such a robust participatory system cannot be implemented, then residents' experiences and expertise should still be integrated into the monitoring process in order to improve accountability, but should do so in ways that place a minimal burden on residents. Some recommendations toward this goal are below.
a. Right to Return
The right to return offers a simple example of how a monitoring system might be designed to better incorporate resident participation. Residents are well-positioned to report their experiences with respect to the right to return. HUD staff might incorporate resident perspectives by making site visits, conducting resident interviews, and serving as ombudsmen and liaisons.
b. Resident Survey
Resident experiences should also be integrated into long-term evaluations of landlord performance. For example, HUD should reinstate the resident survey that, from 1998 to 2013, was used as part of its periodic evaluation of local agencies. 272 The survey assessed the quality of services provided and resident satisfaction levels, 273 but did not address security-in-tenancy or participation rights, 274 accounted for only ten percent of the total performance rating points, 275 and was never adapted for use in privatized public housing. HUD recently eliminated its use on the grounds that the response rate was too low. 276 To promote more robust rights preservation, HUD should reinstate the survey, increase its weight in the performance ratings, and take measures to improve participation rates by involving resident groups, resident advocates, and social service providers in the survey administration and collection process. 277 
c. Grievance Procedures
Grievance data offers another innovative way to incorporate resident input into the enforcement scheme without overly burdening either monitors or residents. Grievance information is already required to be collected. When aggregated, it provides a collective history of resident concerns and a detailed record as to how a landlord has handled those concerns. Yet this data is not presently used for monitoring purposes. Federal monitors TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:759 should systematically analyze grievance data 278 to uncover noncompliance and to trigger investigations or enforcement actions. Formal administrative complaints filed with HUD could be evaluated with the same purposes in mind. A review of grievance and administrative complaint files might reveal not only individual instances of noncompliance, but also broader patterns of noncompliance by related owners at different sites. Violations at one site could warrant an investigation into that landlord's record at other sites, and systematic assessment over time could paint a valuable picture of which landlords repeatedly trigger complaints and flout federal requirements.
This data should also be made publicly available for the benefit of residents, their legal advocates, lawmakers, and the public at large. Information made available across sites and across jurisdictions would help residents allocate scarce resources to areas where litigation or mobilization might have broad impact. 279 In addition, grievance procedures themselves must undergo a number of reforms. Administrative guidance for the RAD programs must be revised to remove any implication that grievance procedures are not required to the full extent intended by Congress. 280 HUD should also conduct a comprehensive review of current grievance procedures, 281 in close consultation with residents and their legal advocates, with the goal of increasing the procedures' effectiveness in fairly and efficiently resolving disputes. At minimum, this review should consider formal training for third-party adjudicators; a requirement that the adjudicator cannot be chosen unilaterally by the landlord; a rule that information revealed during grievance procedures cannot be used in subsequent eviction or other court proceedings; and a requirement that private landlords disseminate clear, concise information to residents about how to effectively access grievance procedures.
d. Participation Rights
Participation rights can be better monitored in a number of ways. First, existing reporting requirements should be revised to include information on how frequently they reach out to resident groups or individuals, how frequently they meet, the general subjects of these meetings, and the outcomes. Self-reporting by landlords should be supplemented by questions posed directly to residents through mechanisms like the resident survey.
Second, participation rights can also be made more meaningful by subjecting private landlords to sunshine requirements mandating public disclosure of certain information. Evaluative assessments, such as grievance data, inspection data, landlord reports to HUD, reasons, however, policymakers should extend RAD's demonstration period for the purpose of experimenting vigorously with more robust monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, then assess whether this in fact deters private-sector participation. As many of the reforms proposed in this article indicate, rights enforcement systems need not be prohibitively resource-intensive, but can incorporate or adapt existing systems to be more effective. Privatization also offers the opportunity to redeploy some existing resources. For example, local government landlords undergo significant monitoring to prevent fraud and waste. 288 Concepts of fraud and waste do not apply to the private sector, however, as private companies are freely permitted to use government dollars inefficiently, and for whatever purpose they wish, as long as they perform under the contract. 289 Consequently, at least some resources previously allocated to monitoring governmental landlords for waste and fraud can now be redirected to rights monitoring.
290
Perhaps the most substantial barrier to reform is not a lack of resources, but the need to shift attention at the federal level to focus on rights enforcement. HUD's weak record on public housing rights enforcement has already been detailed. In some cases, HUD has even affirmatively disavowed any legal obligation to ensure local agency compliance with basic public housing requirements, such as housing quality. 291 A clear legislative mandate like that proposed above will likely help to spur change, but strong leadership is also necessary to reshape the institution into one with an energetic commitment to rights. 292 Such an investment is justified by the importance of the rights at stake, the Congressional call to preserve those rights, and the need to ensure that private actors perform the services for which they are paid. 290. Another area where resources might be redeployed is in physical inspections, which currently take place for both public housing and tax credit purposes. See Hensley, supra note 31. While neither process is always effective, streamlining duplicative reviews into a single, more effective procedure would allow the reallocation of resources to rights preservation. that agencies seek accountability is that it is understood to be part of the agency's mission); Freeman, supra note 5, at 212 ("Government agencies need to view contractual instruments as fullblown accountability mechanisms designed to monitor quality, provide access to decision-making, and ensure procedural fairness . . . . For contracts to be meaningful accountability mechanisms, [] agencies must develop and adapt their monitoring capacity, which requires both adequate funding and a shift in management priorities.").
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In the coming decades, privatized public housing is likely to become the norm. Publicization offers opportunities to protect vulnerable residents, but the effort is so far incomplete. The attention of the federal executive branch must be shifted to rights preservation by way of a Congressional call to action. An effective rights-protection scheme must identify a stronger role for residents in monitoring efforts and acknowledge that their dayto-day experiences are central to this undertaking. It must be designed to not only deter and remedy discrete violations, but also to identify broader patterns and punish habitually poor performers.
Building an effective framework for rights enforcement in the age of privatization requires careful thought and attention. Public housing is in transition, providing a valuable chance for experimentation and assessment. The lessons learned will impact public housing for decades to come and may enhance reform in other privatized industries as well.
